 Open Access
 Total Downloads : 23
 Authors : Sudarshan S, Srinivasa H P
 Paper ID : IJERTCONV3IS19091
 Volume & Issue : ICESMART – 2015 (Volume 3 – Issue 19)
 Published (First Online): 24042018
 ISSN (Online) : 22780181
 Publisher Name : IJERT
 License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Scalable Data Sharing Technique using Key Aggregate Cryptosystem in Cloud Storage
Sudarshan S
M.Tech, CNE student T.John Institute Of Technology
Bangalore, India
Srinivasa H P
Associate Professor, Dept. of CSE T.John Institute Of Technology Bangalore, India
Abstract Recently Data sharing is very important in cloud storage. A new technique is proposed for efficient sharing of data with others in cloud storage in secured manner. We design an efficient publickey encryption scheme which fulfils flexible delegation of decryption rights by a constantsize decryption key of any subset of the ciphertexts. The basic idea is to aggregate a key by making as small single key from any set of secret keys. So, a constantsize aggregate key for flexible choices of cipher text set can be released by the secret key holder in cloud storage. The encrypted files outside the set remain confidential. This single compact aggregate key can be efficiently sent to others or be stored in a smart card with very limited secure storage. The proposed idea is the better publickey patientcontrolled encryption for flexible hierarchy.
Key words Cloud storage, data sharing, keyaggregate encryption, patientcontrolled encryption
I.INTRODUCTION
Recently Cloud storage is rapidly gaining popularity. In company settings, there is rise in demand for data outsourcing, which manages the enterprise data. Cloud storage is used as a back drop behind many online services. File sharing or remote access of data nowadays has become an easy task. With the help of present wireless technologies, data users can access all of their data and emails by a mobile phone from anywhere in the world.
To provide data privacy, a normal way is to depend on the server to provide the access rights after authentication which means any unexpected access privilege will expose the whole data. In a shared cloud computing environment, this becomes even worse. Data from different clients can be loaded on separate virtual machines that reside on a single physical machine. Data in a target VM could be stolen by instantiating another VM coresident with the target one. To check the availability of files, there are few cryptographic schemes which allow a thirdparty to check the existence of files without leaking or compromising any of the data. Cloud users does not hold the belief that the cloud server provides confidentiality The cloud users are motivated to encrypt their data with their own keys before uploading them to the server. Data sharing is an important functionality in cloud storage. Like, bloggers can allow their friends to view a subset of their personal pictures; a company may grant her employees access to a particular portion of important data. The main problem here is how to share encrypted data effectively. Users can also download the encrypted data from the storage, decrypt them, then send them to others for sharing the files, but the value of
cloud storage loses. Data Users should be able to control the access rights of the data sharing to other users by which they can access data from the server directly. Finding an secure and efficient way to share data in cloud storage is not an easy task. Lets take Dropbox as an example for illustration.
Assume Data owner puts all their personal photos on Dropbox, and she does not want to expose her photos to everyone. Data owner wont believe the protection provided by the dropbox, so owner encrypts all the photos with own keys before uploading to cloud. If data owner friends asks to share the photos, data owner can then use the share function of Dropbox, but the problem is how to delegate the decryption rights for the particular photos to other users. A possible option Data owner can choose is to securely send end users the secret keys needed. There are two possible ways for her under the traditional encryption paradigm:

Data owner encrypts all files with a single encryption key and gives end user the secret key directly.

Data owner encrypts files with different keys and sends end users the corresponding secret keys.
The first method is not adequate as all data which is not needed may be also leaked to end user. In the second method, practical concerns on efficiency exist. The number keys is as many as the total number of the photos shared. Transferring these many secret keys requires a secure channel, and storing of these keys requires expensive storage.
The better solution for the above existing problem is that Data owner encrypts all files with distinct publickeys, but sends end user a single constantsize decryption key. The decryption key is sent via a secure channel and kept secret, small key size is always desirable. These secret keys can be stored in the tamperproof memory. The researchers mainly focus on minimizing the communication requirements like aggregate signature, However, not much has been done about the key itself.

Our Contributions
A fundamental problem we often face in modern cryptography is about deligate the secrecy of knowledge to perform cryptographic functions such as encryption and authentication multiple times. Here lets study how to make a decryption key more powerful so that it allows decryption of multiple ciphertexts easily, without increasing the size. Specifically, our problem statement is
Designing a efficient publickey encryption scheme that supports flexible delegation that allows any subset of the ciphertexts are decryptable by a constantsize decryption key.
This problem is solved by introducing a type of publickey encryption called keyaggregate cryptosystem (KAC). In KAC, users encrypt a message under a publickey and also under an identifier of ciphertext called class. That means the ciphertexts are further categorized into different classes. The key owner holds a mastersecret called mastersecret key, which is used to extract secret keys for all classes. The extracted key can be an aggregate key which is as small as a secret key for a single class, but aggregates the power of many keys, that is, the decryption power for any subset of ciphertext classes.
With this solution, Data owner can simply send end users a single aggregate key thorugh a secure email. End users can download the encrypted photos from Data owners Dropbox space and then decrypt these encrypted photos with the help of aggregate key . The scenario is depicted in Figure 1.
The sizes of all the key and aggregate key in this KAC method are all of constant size. The public system parameter has size linear in the number of ciphertext classes, but only a small part of it is needed each time and it can be fetched on demand from large (but nonconfidential) cloud storage.
Existing results achieve a similar property with a constant size decryption key, but the classes need to conform to pre defined hierarchical relationship. KAC is flexible so that this constraint is eliminated, that is, no relation is required between the classes.

KEYAGGREGATE ENCRYPTION
The framework and definition for keyaggregate encryption is described above. Then now describing how to use KAC in a scenario of its applications in cloud storage.
Fig. 1. Alice shares files with identifiers 2, 3, 6 and 8 with Bob by sending him a single aggregate key.

Framework
A keyaggregate encryption scheme(KAC) consists of five polynomialtime algorithms as described below.
The data owner establishes the public system parameter through Setup and generates a public/mastersecret key pair via KeyGen. Messages can be encryptedvia Encrypt by the one who also decides what ciphertext class is associated with the plaintext message to be encrypted. The data owner uses the mastersecret to generate an aggregate constant size decryption key for a set of ciphertext classes via Extract. The generated keys can be passed to delegatees securely. Any user with an aggregate key can be able to decrypt any ciphertext provided that the ciphertexts class is contained in the aggregate key via Decrypt.

Setup(1,n): executed by the data owner to setup an account on an untrusted server. On input a security level parameter 1 and the number of ciphertext classes n (i.e., class index should be an integer bounded by 1 and n), it outputs the public system parameter param, which is omitted from the input of the other algorithms for brevity.

KeyGen: executed by the data owner to randomly generate a public/mastersecret key pair (pk,msk).

Encrypt(pk,i,m): executed by anyone who wants to encrypt data. On input a publickey pk, an index i denoting the ciphertext class, and a message m, it outputs a ciphertext C.

Extract(msk,S): executed by the data owner for delegating the decrypting power for a certain set of ciphertext classes to a delegatee. On input the mastersecret key msk and a set S of indices corresponding to different classes, it outputs the aggregate key for set S denoted by KS.

Decrypt(KS,S,i,C): executed by a delegatee who received an aggregate key KS generated by Extract. On input KS, the set S, an index i denoting the
There are two functional requirements:

Correctness For any integers and n, any set S
{1,Â·Â·Â· ,n}, any index i S and any message m,
Pr[Decrypt(KS,S,i,C) = m : param Setup(1,n), (pk,msk) KeyGen(),C Encrypt(pk,i,m),
KS Extract(msk,S)] = 1.


Compactness For any integers , n, any set S, any index i
S and any message m; param Setup(1,n), (pk,msk)
KeyGen(), KS Extract(msk,S) and C Encrypt(pk,i,m); KS and C only depend on the security parameter but independent of the number of classes n.


Sharing Encrypted Data
The main application of Key Aggregate Cryptosystem is data sharing. The key aggregation property is useful when we need the delegation to be efficient and flexible. This schemes enable a content provider to share data in a confidential and selective and secure way, with a fixed and small ciphertext
expansion, by distributing to each authorized user a single and small aggregate key.
The main idea of data sharing in cloud storage using KAC is described here, illustrated in Figure 2. If Data owner wants to share data m1,m2,…,m on the server. Owner initialy performs Setup(1,n) to get param and execute KeyGen to generate the public/mastersecret key pair (pk,msk). The system parameter param and publickey pk are made public but mastersecret key msk is kept secret by Data owner. Data owner can encrypt every mi by Ci = Encrypt(pk,i,mi). Then the encrypted data are uploaded to the cloud server.
With param and pk, people who cooperate with Data owner can update owners data on the server. Once data owner is willing to share a set S of data with a friend, they can compute the aggregate key KS for End user by performing Extract(msk,S). KS is just a constant size key, it is easy to be sent to end user through a secure email. After getting the aggregate key, end users can download the data that he is authorized to access. That is, for each i S, end users downloads Ci from the server. With the help of aggregate key KS, Bob can decrypt each Ci by Decrypt(KS,S,i,Ci) for each i
S.
secret. The concept can be generalized from a tree to a graph. More advanced cryptographic key assignment schemes support access policy that can be modeled by an acyclic graph or a cyclic graph. Most of these schemes produce keys for symmetrickey cryptosystems, even though the key derivations may require modular arithmetic as used in public key cryptosystems, which are generally more expensive than symmetrickey operations such as pseudorandom function.
We take the tree structure as an example. Alice can first classify the ciphertext classes according to their subjects like Figure 3. Each node in the tree represents a secret key, while the leaf nodes represents the keys for individual ciphertext classes. Filled circles represent the keys for the classes to be delegated and circles circumvented by dotted lines represent the keys to be granted. Note that every key of the nonleaf node can derive the keys of its descendant nodes.


RELATED WORK
This section we compare our basic KAC scheme with other possible solutions on sharing in secure cloud storage. We summarize our comparisons in Table 1.

Cryptographic Keys for a Predefined Hierarchy
We start by discussing the most relevant study in the literature of cryptography/security. Cryptographic key assignment schemes aim to minimize the expense in storing and managing
Fig. 2. Using KAC for data sharing in cloud storage
secret keys for general cryptographic use. Utilizing a tree structure, a key for a given branch can be used to derive the keys of its descendant nodes (but not the other way round). Just granting the parent key implicitly grants all the keys of its descendant nodes. Sandhu proposed a method to generate a tree hierarchy of symmetric keys by using repeated evaluations of pseudorandom function/blockcipher on a fixed
Fig. 3. Compact key is not always possible for a fixed Hierarchy
Decryption key size
Ciphertext size
Encryption type
Key assignment schemes
for a predefined hierarchy (e.g., [7])
most likely nonconstant (depends on the hierarchy)
constant
symmetric or publickey
Symmetrickey encryption with Compact Key (e.g., [8])
constant
constant
symmetrickey
IBE with Compact Key (e.g., [9])
constant
nonconstant
publickey
AttributeBased Encryption (e.g., [10])
nonconstant
constant
publickey
KAC
constant
constant
publickey
TABLE 1
Comparisons between our basic KAC scheme and other related schemes
In Figure 3(a), if Data owner wants to share the personal files, owner only needs to provide the key for the node private, which automatically provides the delegation of the keys of all the descendant nodes (photo, music). This is the ideal for case where classes shared belong to the same branch and thus a parent key of them is sufficient.
It is still difficult to achieve for general cases. As shown in Figure 3(b), if owner shares his data at work with a colleague who has the permission to see some of the private data, what owner can do is to give more keys, which increases the total key size. This approach is not flexible when the classifications are more complex and owner wants to share different sets of files to different users. For this delegate in our example, the number of granted secret keys becomes the same as the number of classes.
In general, hierarchical approaches can solve the problem partially if one intends to share all files under a certain branch in the hierarchy. On average, the number of keys increases with the number of branches. It is unlikely to come up with a hierarchy that can save the number of total keys to be granted for all individuals simultaneously.

Compact Key in SymmetricKey Encryption
Motivated by the same problem of supporting flexible hierarchy in decryption power delegation, Benaloh et al. presented an encryption scheme which is originally proposed for concisely tansmitting large number of keys in broadcast scenario. The construction is simple and we briefly review its key derivation process here for a concrete description of what are the desirable properties we want to achieve. The derivation of the key for a set of classes is as follows. A composite modulus N = p Â· q is chosen where p and q are two large random primes. A master secret key Y is chosen at random from ZN. Each class is associated with a distinct prime ei. All these prime numbers can be put in the public system parameter5 A constantsize key for set S0 can be generated (with the knowledge of (N)) as kS0 = Y 1/QjS0(ej) mod N. For those who have been delegated the access rights for
S
S
S where S0 S, kS0 can be computed by k QjS\S0 (ej). As a concrete example, a key for classes represented by e1,e2,e3 can be generated as Y 1/(e1Â·e2Â·e3), from which each of Y 1/e1, Y 1/e2, Y 1/e3 can easily be derived (while providing no information about keys for any other class, say, e4). This approach achieves similar properties and performances as our schemes. However, it is designed for the symmetrickey setting instead. The encrypter needs to get the corresponding secret keys to
encrypt data, which is not suitable for many applications. Since their method is used to generate a secret value rather than a pair of public/secret keys, it is unclear how to apply this idea for publickey encryption scheme.
Finally, we note that there are schemes which try to reduce the key size for achieving authentication in symmetrickey encryption. Sharing of decryption power is not a concern in these schemes.

Compact Key in IdentityBased Encryption
Identitybased encryption (IBE) is a type of publickey encryption in which the publickey of a user can be set as an identitystring of the user. There is a trusted party called private key generator (PKG) in IBE which holds a master secret key and issues a secret key to each user with respect to the user identity. The encryptor can take the public parameter and a user identity to encrypt a message. The recipient can decrypt this ciphertext by his secret key.
Guo et al. tried to build IBE with key aggregation. One of their schemes assumes random oracles but another does not. In their schemes, key aggregation is constrained in the sense that all keys to be aggregated must come from different identity divisions. While there are an exponential number of identities and thus secret keys, only a polynomial number of them can be aggregated. Most importantly, their keyaggregation, comes at the expense of O(n) sizes for both ciphertexts and the public parameter, where n is the number of secret keys which can be aggregated into a constant size one. This greatly increases the costs of storing and transmitting ciphertexts, which is impractical in many situations such as shared cloud storage. As we mentioned, our schemes feature constant ciphertext size, and their security holds in the standard model.
In fuzzy IBE, one single compact secret key can decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under many identities which are close in a certain metric space, but not for an arbitrary set of identities and therefore it does not match with our idea of key aggregation.

Other Encryption Schemes
Attributebased encryption (ABE) allows each ciphertext to be associated with an attribute, and the mastersecret key holder can extract a secret key for a policy of these attributes so that a ciphertext can be decrypted by this key if its associated attribute conforms to the policy. For example, with the secret
key for the policy (2 3 6 8), anyone can decrypt ciphertext with class 2,3,6 or 8. The major concern in ABE is collusionresistance. The size of the key often increases with the number of attributes it encompasses.
Proxy reencryption(PRE) is used to delegate the decryption rights of some ciphertexts without sending the secret key to the delegate. A PRE method allows Data owner to delegate to the server, the ability to convert the ciphertexts encrypted under publickey into ones for End user. PRE is known to have many applications which include cryptographic file system. Data owner has to trust the proxy that it only converts ciphertexts according to their instruction, which we need to avoid first. If the proxy collides with end user, some form of Data owner secret key can be obtained which can decrypt owners ciphertexts without the help of end user. The transformation key of server need to be protected. Using PRE moves the secure key storage requirement from the delegate to the proxy server. It is undesirable to let the proxy reside in the storage server. That will also be inconvenient since every decryption need separate interaction with the proxy.


CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS OF KAC
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of prime order p and e : GÃ—GGT be a map with the following properties:

Bilinear:.

Nondegenerate: for some g G, e(g,g) 6= 1.
G is a bilinear group if all the operations involved above are efficiently computable. Many classes of elliptic curves feature bilinear groups.

A Basic Construction
The design of this scheme is inspired from the collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme which is proposed by Boneh et al.. Their scheme supports constantsize secret keys, though every key only has the power for decrypting ciphertexts of a particular index. Thus there is need to devise a new Extract algorithm and the corresponding Decrypt algorithm.

Setup(1,n): Randomly pick a bilinear group G of prime order p where , a generator g G and
R Zp. Compute gi = g G for i =
1,Â·Â·Â· ,n,n+2,Â·Â·Â· ,2n. Output the system parameter as param = hg,g1,Â·Â·Â· ,gn,gn+2,Â·Â·Â· ,g2ni ( can be safely deleted after Setup).
Note that each ciphertext class is represented by an index in the integer set {1,2,Â·Â·Â· ,n}, where n is the maximum number of ciphertext classes.

KeyGen(): Pick R Zp, output the public and master secret key pair: (pk = v = g,msk = ).
ICESMART2015 Conference Proceedings
Fig 4: key assignment in KAC approach

Encrypt(pk,i,m): For a message m GT and an index i
{1,2,Â·Â·Â· ,n}, randomly pick t R Zp and compute the ciphertext as C = hgt,(vgi)t,m Â· e(g1,gn)ti.

Extract(msk = ,S): For the set S of indices js, the aggregate key is computed as .
Since S does not include 0, gn+1j = gn+1j can always be retrieved from param.

Decrypt(KS,S,i,C = hc1,c2,c3i): If i / S, output

. Otherwise, return the message: m = c3 Â· e(KS Â·
For the data owner, with the knowledge of , the term e(g1,gn)t can be easily recovered by e(c1,gn) = e(gt,gn) = e(g1,gn)t.
For correctness, we can see that

Performance
For encryption, the value e(g1,gn) can be precomputed and put in the system parameter. On the other hand, we can see that decryption only takes two pairings while only one of them involves the aggregate key. That means we only need one pairing computation within the security chip storing the (secret) aggregate key. It is fast to compute a pairing nowadays, even in resource constrained devices. Efficient software implementations exist even for sensor nodes.

Discussions
The magic of getting constantsize aggregate key and constantsize ciphertext simultaneously comes from the linear size system parameter. Our motivation is to reduce the secure storage and this is a tradeoff between Fig. 4. Key assignment in our approach two kinds of storage. The parameter can be placed in nonconfidential local storage or in a cache provided by the service company. They can also be fetched on demand, as not all of them are required in all occasions. The system parameter can also be generated by a trusted party, shared between all users and even hardcoded to the user program
(and can be update via patches). In this case, while the users need to trust the parametergenerator for securely erasing any ephemeral values used, the access control is still ensured by a cryptographic mean instead of relying on some server to restrict the accesses honestly.

PublicKey Extension
If a user needs to classify his ciphertexts into more than n
classes, he can register for additional key pairs
(pk2,msk2),Â·Â·Â· ,(pk`,msk`). Each class now is indexed by a 2 level index in {(i,j)1 i `,1 j n} and the number of classes is increased by n for each added key. Since the new publickey can be essentially treated as a new user, one may have the concern that key aggregation across two independent users is not possible. It seems that we face the problem of hierarchical solution as reviewed in Section 1, but indeed, we still achieve shorter key size and gain flexibility as illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the flexibility of our approach. We achieve local aggregation, which means the secret keys under the same branch can always be aggregated. A quaternary tree for the last level just for better illustration of our distinctive feature. Our advantage is still preserved when compared with quaternary trees in hierarchical approach, in which the latter either delegates the decryption power for all 4 classes (if the key for their parent class is delegated) or the number of keys will be the same as the number of classes. For our approach, at most 2 aggregate keys are needed in our example.
Below the details on how encryption and decryption work when the publickey is extended, which is similar to the n approach.

Setup and KeyGen: Same as the basic construction.

Extend(pkl,mskl): Execute KeyGen() to get (vl+1,l+1) G
Ã— Zp, output the extended public and mastersecret keys as
pkl+1 = (pkl,vl+1),mskl+1 = (mskl,l+1).

Encrypt(pkl,(a,b),m): Let pkl = {v1,Â·Â·Â· ,vl}. For an index (a,b),1 a l,1 b n, pick t R Zp, output the ciphertext as C = hgt,(vagb)t,m Â· e(g1,gn)ti.

Extract(mskl,Sl): Let mskl = {1,2,Â·Â·Â· ,l}. For a set Sl of indices (i,j),1 i l,1 j n, get
gn+1j = gn+1j from param, output:

Decrypt(KSl,Sl,(a,b),C): If (a,b) / Sl, output . Otherwise, let KSl = (d1,Â·Â·Â· ,dl) and C = hc1,c2,c3i. Output the message:
.
Just like the basic construction, the decryption can be done more efficiently with the knowledge of is.
Correctness is not much more difficult to see:
We can also prove the semantic security of this extended scheme. The proof is very similar to that for the basic scheme and therefore is omitted. The publickey of our CCA construction to be presented below can also be extended using the same Extend algorithm.

Discussions
To make the best out of our extended scheme (i.e., to make the key size as small as possible), we suggest that the ciphertext classes for different purposes should be corresponded to different publickeys. This is reasonable in practice and does not contradict our criticism on hierarchical methods that an efficient assignment of hierarchy requires a priori knowledge on what to be shared. Using our example, pk1 and pk2 correspond to personal and work. It is likely to have many subcategories under either of them but it may not be equally likely to share both of them (if the user does not gossip about office drama with friends and do not expose party photos to colleagues). Another example, say a users categorization include music and game. One day she becomes a graduate student and needs to publish, and therefore find the new need to add a category paper, which is probably independent of music and game.

Other Implication

This key extension approach can also be seen as a key update process. In case a secret value is compromised, we can replace the compromised pk1 with a new key pk2. The small aggregate key size minimizes the communication overhead for transferring the new key.


PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Compression Factors
For a concrete comparison, we investigate the space requirements of the treebased key assignment approach we described in Section 3.1. This is used in the Complete Subtree scheme, which is a representative solution to the broadcast encryption problem following the wellknown SubsetCover framework [33]. It employs a static logical key hierarchy, which is materialized with a full binary key tree of height h (equals to 3 in Figure 3), and thus can support up to 2h ciphertext classes, a selected part of which is intended for an authorized delegatee.
In an ideal case as depicted in Figure 3(a), the delegatee can be granted the access to 2hs classes with the possession of only one key, where hs is the height of a certain subtree (e.g., hs = 2 in Figure 3(a)). On the other hand, to decrypt ciphertexts of a set of classes, sometimes the delegatee may have to hold a large number of keys, as depicted in Figure 3(b). Therefore, we are interested in na, the number of symmetrickeys to be assigned in this hierarchical key approach, in an average sense.
There are exactly 2h ciphertext classes, and the delegatee of concern is entitled to a portion r of them. That is, r is the delegation ratio, the ratio of the delegated ciphertext classes to the total classes. Obviously, if r = 0, n a should also be 0, which means no access to any of the classes; if r = 100%, n a should be as low as 1, which means that the possession of only the root key in the hierarchy can grant the access to all the 2h classes. Consequently, one may expect that na may first increase with r, and may decrease later. We set r = 10%,20%,Â·Â·Â· ,90%, and choose the portion in a random manner to model an arbitrary delegation pattern for different delegatees. For each combination of r and h, we randomly
which deviates from the intuition that only a small number of powerful keys are needed for delegating most of the classes. We can only get a high (but still small) compression factor when the delegation ratio is close to 1.
A comparison of the number of granted keys between three methods is depicted in Figure 5(b). We can see that if we grant the key one by one, the number of granted keys would be equal to the number of the delegated ciphertext classes. With the treebased structure, we can save a number of granted keys according to the delegation ratio. On the contrary, in our proposed approach, the delegation of decryption can be efficiently implemented with the aggregate key, which is only of fixed size.
In our experiment, the delegation is randomly chosen. It models the situation that the needs for delegating to different users may not be predictable as time goes by, even after a careful initial planning. This gives empirical evidences to support our thesis that hierarchical key assignment does not save much in all cases.
h
r
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.95
16
na
6224.8
11772.5
16579.3
20545.8
23520.7
25263.8
25400.1
23252.6
17334.6
11670.2
na N
4.75%
8.98%
12.65%
15.68%
17.94%
19.27%
19.38%
17.74%
13.23%
8.90 %
18
na
24895.8
47076.1
66312.4
82187.1
94078.8
101052.4
101594.8
93025.4
69337.4
46678.8
a N
4.75%
8.98%
12.65%
15.68%
17.94%
19.27%
19.38%
17.74%
13.23%
8.90 %
20
na
99590.5
188322.0
265254.1
328749.5
376317.4
404205.0
406385.1
372085.2
277343.1
186725.4
na N
4.75%
8.98%
12.65%
15.68%
17.94%
19.27%
19.38%
17.74%
13.22%
8.90 %
TABLE 2
Compression ratios for different delegation ratios and tree heights
generate 104 different combinations of classes to be delegated, and the output key set size na is the average over random delegations.
We tabulate the results in Table 2, where h = 16,18,20 respectively6. For a given h, na increases with the delegation ratio r until r reaches 70%. An amazing fact is that, the ratio of na to N(= 2h+1 1), the total number of keys in the hierarchy (e.g., N = 15 in Figure 3), appears to be only determined by r but irrelevant of h. This is because when the number of ciphertext classes (2h) is large and the delegation ratio (r) is fixed, this kind of random delegation achieves roughly the same key assignment ratios (na/N). Thus, for the same r, na
grows exponentially with h. We can easily estimate how many keys we need to assign when we are given r and h.
We then turn our focus to the compression7 factor F for a certain h, i.e., the average number of delegated classes that each granted key can decrypt. Specifically, it is the ratio of the total number of delegated classes (r2h) to the number of granted keys required (na). Certainly, higher compression factor is preferable because it means each granted key can decrypt more ciphertexts. Figure 5(a) illustrates the relationship between the compression factor and the delegation ratio. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that F = 3.2 even for delegation ratio of r = 0.9, and F < 6 for r = 0.95,

Performance of Our Proposed Schemes
This approaches allow the compression factor F to be a tunable parameter, at the cost of O(n)sized system parameter. Encryption can be done in constant time, while decryption can be done in O(S) group multiplications (or point addition on elliptic curves) with 2 pairing operations, where S is the set of ciphertext classes decryptable by the granted aggregate key and S n. As expected, key extraction requires O(S) group multiplications as well, which seems unavoidable.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) Compression achieved by the treebased approach for delegating different ratio of the classes ( b ) Number of granted keys (n a) required for different approaches in the case of 65536 classes of data
However, as demonstrated by the experiment results, we do
TypeA curves do not provide the shortest representation for group elements. In our implementation, p is a 160bit Solinas prime, which offers 1024bit of discretelogarithm security. With this TypeA curves setting in PBC, elements of groups G and GT take 512 and 1024 bits to represent, respectively.
The test machine is a Sun UltraSparc IIIi system with dual CPU (1002 MHz) running Solaris, each with 2GB RAM. The timings reported below are averaged over 100 randomized runs. In this experiment, take the number of ciphertext classes n = 216 = 65536. The Setup algorithm, while outputting (2n +
1) elements by doing (2n 2) exponentiations, can be made efficient by preprocessing function offered by PBC, which saves time for exponentiating the same element (g) in the long run. This is the only lowlevel optimization trick we have used. All other operations are implemented in a straightforward manner. In particular, we did not exploit the fact that e(g1,gn) will be exponentiated many times across different encryptions. However, we precomputed its value in the setup stage, such that the encryption can be done without computing any pairing.
Our experiment results are shown in Table 3. The execution times of Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt are independent of the delegation ratio r. In our experiments, KeyGen takes 3.3 milliseconds and Encrypt takes 6.8 milliseconds. As expected, the running time complexities of Extract and Decrypt increase linearly with the delegation ratio r (which determines the size of the delegated set S). Our timing results also conform to what can be seen from the equation in Extract and Decrypt two pairing operations take negligible time, the running time of Decrypt is roughly a double of Extract. Note that our experiments dealt with up to 65536 number of classes (which is also the compression factor), and should be large enough for finegrained data sharing in most situations.
Finally, we remark that for applications where the number of ciphertext classes is large but the nonconfidential storage is limited, one should deploy our schemes using the TypeD pairing bundled with the PBC, which only requires 170bit to represent an element in G. For n = 216, the system parameter
r
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.95
Setup
8.4
Extract
2
4
5
7
8
9
10
10
11
11
Decrypt
4
6
9
12
14
15
16
18
20
20
TABLE 3
Performance of our basic construction for h = 16 with respect to different delegation ratio r (in milliseconds)
not need to set a very high n to have better compression than the treebased approach. Note that group multiplication is a very fast operation.
Again, we confirm empirically that our analysis is true. We implemented the basic KAC system in C with the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) Library 8 version 0.4.18 for the underlying ellipticcurve group and pairing operations. Since the granted key can be as small as one G element, and the ciphertext only contains two
G and one GT elements, used (symmetric) pairings over Type A curves as defined in the PBC library which offers the highest efficiency among all types of curves, even though
requires approximately 2.6 megabytes, which is as large as a lower quality MP3 file or a higherresolution JPEG file that a typical cellphone can store more than a dozen of them. But saved expensive secure storage without the hassle of managing a hierarchy of delegation classes.


NEW PATIENTCONTROLLED ENCRYPTION
Motivated by the nationwide effort to computerize Americas medical records, the concept of patientcontrolled encryption (PCE) has been studied. In PCE, the health record is decomposed into a hierarchical representation based on the use of different ontologies, and patients are the parties who generate and store secret keys. When there is a need for a
healthcare personnel to access part of the record, a patient will release the secret key for the concerned part of the record. In the work of Benaloh et al., three solutions have been provided, which are symmetrickey PCE for fixed hierarchy, publickey PCE for fixed hierarchy, and RSAbased symmetrickey PCE for flexible hierarchy (which is the set membership access policy as we explained).
This work provides a candidate solution for the missing piece, publickey PCE for flexible hierarchy, which the existence of an efficient contruction was an open question. Any patient can either define her own hierarchy according to her need, or follow the set of categories suggested by the electronic medical record system she is using, such as clinic visits, xrays, allergies, medications and so on. When the patient wishes to give access rights to her doctor, she can choose any subset of these categories and issue a single key, from which keys for all these categories can be computed. Thus, we can essentially use any hierarchy we choose, which is especially useful when the hierarchy can be complex. Finally, one healthcare personnel deals with many patients and the patient record is possible stored in cloud storage due to its huge size (e.g., high resolution medical imaging employing x ray), compact key size and easy key management are of paramount importance.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

How to protect users data privacy is a central question of cloud storage. With more mathematical tools, cryptographic schemes are getting more versatile and often involve multiple keys for a single application. In this article, we consider how to compress secret keys in publickey cryptosystems which support delegation of secret keys for different ciphertext classes in cloud storage. No matter which one among the power set of classes, the delegatee can always get an aggregate key of constant size. Our approach is more flexible than hierarchical key assignment which can only save spaces if all keyholders share a similar set of privileges.
A limitation in is the predefined bound of the number of maximum ciphertext classes. In cloud storage, the number of ciphertexts usually grows rapidly. So have to reserve enough ciphertext classes for the future extension. Otherwise, we need to expand the publickey as we described in Section 4.2.
Although the parameter can be downloaded with ciphertexts, it would be better if its size is independent of the maximum number of ciphertext classes. On the other hand, when one carries the delegated keys around in a mobile device without using special trusted hardware, the key is prompt to leakage, designing a leakageresilient cryptosystem yet allows efficient and flexible key delegation is also an interesting direction.
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