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A Survey On An Intrusion Detection And Response System For Relational Databases

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ABSTRACT

The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) notifies the system administrator that an intrusion has occurred or is occurring and the system administrator must respond to the intrusion. Regardless of the notification system engaged, there is a delay among detection of a possible intrusion and response to that intrusion. The intrusion response component of intrusion detection system is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous request. Intrusion response systems are mostly responsible for action taking or generating alarms or responding either way, so that the alert may be generated against intrusion attack. In this paper we are presenting some techniques of intrusion response system (IRS) for databases. In this paper we also discuss various techniques along with their results proposed by various researchers

1. INTRODUCTION

Protecting networks from computer security attacks is a vital apprehension of computer security. In intrusion prevention and intrusion detection systems have been the subject of much study and have been covered in several excellent survey papers. Intrusion detection systems seek to detect the behavior of an adversary by observing its manifestations on the system. The discovery is done at runtime when the attack has been launched. Organizations have also come to realize that current attack techniques are more complicated, prepared, and targeted than the sophisticated hacking days of past. Often, it is the susceptible and proprietary data that is the real target of attackers [1].

An intrusion-detection system (IDS) can be defined as a tools, solution, and resources used to help identify, assess, and to claim unauthorized or unapproved network action. Intrusion detection is typically one part of an overall protection system that is installed around a system or device—it is not a stand-alone protection measure. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an essential part in a good network security environment. It enables detection of suspicious packets and attacks. With the help of IDs, all network traffic can be observed.

Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) in wired networks analyse the behaviour of the elements in the network trying to identify anomalies produced by intruders and, once identified, start a response against the intruders. These detection systems are usually placed in those elements with more confluent traffic such as routers, gateways, and switches. Unfortunately, in ad-hoc networks, those elements are not uses, and it is not possible to guess which nodes will route more traffic from its neighbours and install IDS systems only in those nodes [2].

Current intrusion detection systems (IDS) have limited response mechanisms that are inadequate given the existing threat. Although IDS investigate has focused on better techniques for intrusion detection, intrusion response remains primarily a manual process. The IDS alerts the system administrator that an attack or intrusion has happened or is taking place and the system administrator must react to the intrusion. In spite of the notification method employed, there is a delay between detection of a possible intrusion and response to that intrusion. This delay in notification and response, varies from minutes to months, presents a window of occasion for attackers to exploit. An automated intrusion response system provides the best possible defence and shortens or closes this window of opportunity until the system administrator can take an active role in defending against the attack. Unfortunately, no such response system exists.

Intrusion detection techniques are traditionally categorized into two methodologies: anomaly detection and misuse detection.

Anomalies based intrusion detection: Anomaly based intrusion detection systems base their decisions on anomalies, belongings that do not usually occur. If a user unexpectedly starts a new program he never used or logs in to a machine at 4 o'clock in the morning, the system generates an alert announcing that something isn't running as usual.

Misuse detection: Misuse detection seizes intrusions in terms of the characteristics of known attacks or system vulnerabilities; any action that conforms to the pattern of a known attack or vulnerability is considered intrusive.

The components of Intrusion Detection System can be of three types.

Network intrusion detection: Network intrusion detection systems listen to network communications. They are acquainted with intrusions which come during the networking environment. Essentially a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is a service which listens on a network interface looking for suspicious traffic. Network intrusion detection systems are mostly signature based.

Host Based Intrusion Detection: Host intrusion detection systems (HIDS) inhabit on a resource supervised. This resource is mostly a computer server or workstation. HIDS seem at produced log files, changes in the file system or check for changes in the process table. Their objective is to identify intrusions into a host.

***Signature based intrusion detection*:** Signature based intrusion is based on signatures of known attacks. These signatures are accumulated and evaluated against events or received traffic. If a pattern matches, an alert is generated.

The autonomous intrusion response systems (IRSs) are designed to respond at runtime to the attack in development. The goals of an IRS may be a combination of the following – to contain the effect of the current attack if the underlying model is that it is a multi-stage attack, to recover the exaggerated services, and to take longer term actions of reconfiguration of the system to make future attacks of a similar kind less expected to be successful. There are numerous challenges in the design of an IRS. First, the attacks through automated scripts are fast moving through the different services in the system. Second, the nature of the distributed applications enables the spread of the attack, since under normal behavior the services have interactions among them and a compromised service can contaminate another. Third, the owner of the distributed system does not have knowledge of or access to the internals of the different services.

Monitoring a database to detect potential intrusions, intrusion detection (ID), is a crucial technique that has to be part of any comprehensive security solution for high-assurance database security. The ID systems that are developed must be tailored for a Database Management System (DBMS) since database-related attacks such as SQL injection and data ex-filtration are not malicious for the underlying operating system or the network [1].

A. Intrusion Response Approaches

There are three principal approaches for intrusion response: notification, manual response, and automatic response.

i. Notification

The majority of intrusion detection and response systems are notification based systems that generate reports and alarms only. Periodic reports were the earliest form of intrusion response. Ranging in frequency from daily to monthly, reports record suspicious users so that the system administrator could further investigate potential intrusions. The frequency of reporting delimits the window of opportunity that an attacker can exploit. Reporting is still an important component of any intrusion response system is not a viable means of intrusion response by itself.

Alarms generate immediate messages to alert the system administrator to potential intrusive behaviour. Alarms can be presented in a variety of formats including email messages, console alerts, and/or pager activations. After notification, further intrusion response is left as the responsibility of the system administrator.

ii. Manual Response

Some systems provide the additional capability for the system administrator to initiate a manual response from a pre-programmed set of responses. These systems often guide the user through the selection of correct responses while allowing the system administrator to make the final decision on appropriate responses. This allows a system administrator to respond more rapidly to intrusions and for inexperienced system administrators to receive assistance in selecting the correct response. While this capability is more useful than notification, there is still a time gap between when the intrusion is detected and when the system administrator initiates a response. This window of exploitive opportunity is still too large into today's computing environment and manual response systems are being replaced by systems that incorporate automatic intrusion response.

iii. Automatic Intrusion Response

Automatic intrusion response systems do not wait for the system administrator to initiate a response but instead automatically respond to intrusive behaviour. There are two approaches to providing automatic intrusion response: decision tables and rule-based systems. The most common approach is for the use of a simple decision table where a particular response is associated with a particular attack. Whenever an attack occurs, the response is executed. If the attack occurs one thousand times in a row (e.g. a denial of service attack), the same response is executed one thousand times. Some automatic intrusion response systems employ a rule-based decision module to determine the appropriate response to intrusive behaviour.

B. Intrusion Response Techniques

There are a variety of techniques for responding to an intrusion. These techniques range from generating a report to launching a counterattack against the attacker. In determining the appropriate response to an intrusion, there are a number of criteria that must be considered to determine an appropriate response. These criteria are:

- **Timing:** The timing of detection and response determines which responses may be appropriate. Different responses are appropriate prior to an attack, during an attack, and after an attack.
- **Type of Attacker:** The response should be tailored so as to be effective against the kind of attacker. There is dissimilarity in responding to "script kiddy" as opposed to an attack launched by a military organization.
- **Type of Attack:** Responses to intrusion should be tailored to the type of attack. If a user account is compromised, locking that user account is an appropriate response. Locking a user account, however, would be ineffective against a race condition exploit.
- **Implications of the Attack:** Different systems have differing degrees of importance within an organization. This difference in criticality should lead to different responses, to the same attack, against different targets. For example, the response should be different if it is a denial of service attack against a single workstation as compared to a buffer overflow attack against an institutional Domain Name Server.
- **Degree of Suspicion:** Intrusion detection is not an exact science and as a result, intrusion detection systems can generate false positive results. Some user activity is clearly intrusive while other activity may be indicative of intrusive behaviour or may be normal user activity. The response must be tempered by the strength of suspicion that an actual intrusion is occurring.
- **Environmental Constraints:** Legal, ethical, institutional, and resource constraints limit what responses are appropriate.

i. Generate a Report

All intrusive behaviour should be logged so that it can be reviewed by a system administrator. These reports provide critical information for the resolution of ongoing incidents and facilitate long-term analysis of security attacks.

ii. Generate an Alarm

The success of an attack is dependent on the time between detection and response. Alarms, implemented through email messages, console messages, pagers, or even loudspeaker announcements, notify the system administrator that an attack is underway. Not all intrusive behaviour, however, should generate an alarm. There is a difference, for example, between a single failed SUDO attempt and one hundred failed SUDO attempts from the same user. The latter should generate an alarm while the former probably should not except on the most sensitive systems.

iii. Lock User Account

If a user account has been compromised, an appropriate response would be to lock that user's account so that it cannot be used to launch future attacks.

iv. Suspend User Jobs

If there are indications of intrusive behaviour as well as normal user operations, the suspension of user jobs and termination of user sessions allows the system administrator the opportunity to terminate any intrusive jobs while not corrupting valid user tasks. While termination of user sessions without suspension of user jobs would be a more common response, there are circumstances when it would be desirable to suspend user jobs.

v. Terminate User Session

If a user is involved in intrusive behaviour, the user's session should be terminated and the user's account locked to prevent future damage.

vi. Enable Additional Logging

Some user behaviour cannot be unambiguously characterized as intrusive behaviour but is nonetheless indicative of possible intrusive behaviour. In such cases, enabling additional logging allows for the gathering of additional information that may help in classifying the user's behaviour.

vii. Enable Remote Logging

Additional logging may not be sufficient against certain types of attacks or attackers and instead, remotely logging to another system or a non-changeable media (such as CD-ROM or a printer) may be a better technique for gathering additional information on the attacker.

viii. Block IP Address

If the IP address of an attacking system can be identified, some network attacks can be neutralized by blocking, at a router, all traffic from that address. While this protection is often temporary if the attacker can change their IP address, it will slow the attacker and allow the intrusion response system or system administrator more time to respond to an attack.

ix. Enable additional intrusion detection tools

Because intrusion detection tools are imperfect and consume system resources, intrusion response systems may enable additional intrusion detection tools as the degree of suspicion increases that an intrusion is ongoing. More robust and costly detection tools are employed as additional indicators of intrusive behaviour are found.

x. Shutdown Host

Sometimes the only mechanism for protecting against further system compromise is to shut down the machine. While this is a draconian measure, it is sometimes the only mechanism for protecting a host under an active attack.

xi. Disconnect from the Network

For network-based attacks, disconnecting from the network is less draconian than shutting down the host but has the same effect - network-based attacks can no longer affect the system allowing the system administrator time to response to an attack and repair any damage to the attacked system.

xii. Disabling the Attacked Ports or Services

If a single service or well-known port is being used as the basis for the attack, that port or service can be disabled effectively stopping the attack without affecting any of the other services offered by the system.

xiii. Warn the Intruder

Most attackers operate with the assumption that they are not being actively monitored or that they can evade intrusion detection systems. Telling the intruder that they are actively being monitored all that is required for them to abandon the attack.

xiv. Trace connection

Criminal prosecution of computer attackers, while a viable response to intrusions, is outside the scope of intrusion response systems. However, tracing by the network connection of an attacker so that the attacker can be positively identified is a viable response. As a side effect, the attempt to trace back a connection can be detected by the attacker. For less experienced attackers, the fact that someone is actively trying to trace them will often result in the termination of the attack.

xv. Force Additional Authentication

Forcing additional authentication slows down or stops an attack while allowing authorized users to continue to use the affected system. The suspected intruder must provide additional proof of their identity before they can execute commands.

xvi. Create Backups

Attacks against the integrity of a system can be thwarted by creating up-to-date system backups for system restoration and file comparison. While it is often impractical to maintain real-time backups of all modified files, as the degree of suspicion that the system is being attacked increases, the time interval between backups should be decreased so as to limit lost or corrupted data.

xvii. Employ Temporary Shadow Files

A temporary shadow file is a duplicate file created and encrypted to protect the original file. When an intruder attempts to modify a critical system file, all modifications are saved in a second file and the original file remains unchanged. Additional modification attempts result in changes to the temporary shadow file and not the original file.

xviii. Restrict User Activity

Suspicious users may be restricted to a special user shell that allows some functionality while limiting the ability of the user to execute certain commands. This will slow the user's ability to damage the system without terminating a user session, suspending user jobs, or requiring additional authentication.

2. BACKGROUND

Intrusion Response systems are becoming increasingly important due to connectivity, increased threats, and increased financial incentive for attackers. The advent of the WWW has led to increased interconnectivity, increased demands for network services, and increased threats. Electronic commerce not only offers new services for customers but new opportunities for significant financial reward to intruders. The response component is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous user request. On behalf of this component IDS further decide to take action.

3. RELATED WORK

Ashish Kamra et al [1] proposed Design and Implementation of an Intrusion Response System for Relational Databases. They describe response component of intrusion detection system for a DBMS. They offer the notion of database response policies for specifying appropriate response actions. In this an interactive Event-Condition-Action type response policy language that makes it very easy for the database security administrator to specify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the nature of the anomalous request. The two main issues are addressed in the context of such response policies ‘policy matching’ and ‘policy administration’. Policy matching procedure described algorithms to efficiently search the policy database for policies matching an anomalous request assessment. As per result obtained proposed scheme was very efficient [1].

This approach to an ID mechanism consists of two essentials, distinctively tailored to a DBMS: an anomaly detection (AD) system and an anomaly response system. The primary component is based on the production of database access profiles of roles and users, and on the employ of such profiles for the AD job. A user demand that does not conform to the standard access profiles is characterized as anomalous [1].

The second element of approach is in charge of taking some actions once an anomaly is sensed. There are three kinds of response actions conventional actions, fine-grained actions, and aggressive actions. The unadventurous proceedings, such as conveyance an alert, allow the uncharacteristic request to go throughout, whereas the aggressive actions can effectively block the uncharacteristic request. Fine-grained response procedures, on another hand, are neither conservative nor destructive. Such proceedings may suspend or taint an anomalous request [3, 4]. A suspended request is basically put on hold, until some explicit actions are implemented by the user, like the execution of further authentication steps. A contaminated request is discernible as a potential suspicious request resulting in further monitoring of the user and possibly in the suspension or dropping of subsequent requests by the same user [1].

In year of 2012, Dubey et al [2] proposed a Multiple Critical Node Detection in MANET for Secure Communication. In this scheme they mainly concentrate the cost of intrusion detection system and the effective positioning. They focused on those routing systems to detect misbehavior from the nodes and differentiate if the misbehavior is produced by an intruder or, in the other hand, if is the normal misbehave in mobile wireless networks (e.g. lack of signal, routing tables not updated).

The reputations of the nodes, based on their past history of relaying packets, can be accessed by their neighbors to guarantee that the packet will be relayed by the node. Here we present an intrusion detection scheme (IDS) to detect and defend against malicious nodes' attacks in MANET. The IDS are applied on the critical nodes because it is the perfect location to identify misbehavior of connected nodes. If the possibility of congestion will occur in the network then senders are reduce their transfer rate. If the channel carry on to be congested because some sender nodes do not reduce their sending rate, it can be found by the destination. It checks the previous sending rate of a flow with its current transfer rate. When both the rates are identical, the consequent sender of the flow is considered as an attacker. Once the malicious nodes are identified kill those nodes [2].

The vital (critical) node test detects nodes whose failure with malicious behaviour spread over the network that disconnects or significantly degrades the performance of the network (i.e. introduces unacceptably long unconventional paths). Figure 1 represents the attacker free network by that numbers of nodes are communicate with each other though a common link for example if A3 want to send their data to C3 then data first come to B then C then C3. In this fig number of nodes are depends on a single node and a single path through that node. These nodes are the vital or critical nodes and the link between them are called critical link [2].



Figure 1: Attack free communication among the nodes [2].

Attackers or malicious nodes jam that type of network by sending the huge number of data and routing packets through a common link then congestion occur in the network. Single attacker not affect the network easily but multiple critical nodes are easily destroyed that type of network. Fig 2 show the network affected by malicious nodes [2].



Figure 2: The presence of attack on critical nodes [2].

In this figure the nodes A, B and C are the critical nodes. The link A to B and B to C or vice versa having a capacity to forwarded maximum amount of data suppose 2 megabytes/sec. And the capacities of sending data of connected nodes are also limited and each and every node in the network is do their work under limitation. Now the malicious nodes are uncertainly deliver routing packets and data packets in the network by that congestion occur in the network [2].

In year 2012 Cheng-Yuan Ho et al [5] proposed "Statistical Analysis of False Positives and False Negatives from Real Traffic with Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems. This mechanism is beneficial for false positive/negative assessment with multiple Intrusion Detection Systems, Intrusion Protection Systems to collect False Positive and

False Negative cases from real-world traffic and statistically analyze these cases.

According to [5] the false positive/negative assessment (FPNA) collected more than two thousand False Positives and False Negatives during sixteen months. 92.85 percent of false cases were False Positives and 7.15 percent were False Negatives. Although there are thousands of False Positive and False Negative cases in this work, these False Positives/FALSE Negatives are detected by the signature-based IDSs/IPSs. Maybe some False Positives or False Negatives occur in the anomaly-based IDSs/IPSs, and accordingly, new DUTs, including anomaly-based or online/cloud IDSs/IPSs.

False Positives and False Negatives of the IDS/IPS are mystery terms that illustrate a situation where the IDS/IPS makes a mistake. The former means that the IDS/IPS triggers an alert when there is no malicious activity in the traffic while the latter means that there is no alert raised by the IDS/IPS when malicious traffic passes through it. The evaluation is important to IDS/IPS developers trying to optimize the correctness of detection by reducing both False Positives and False Negatives, because the False Positives / False Negatives rate limits the performance of network security systems due to the base-rate fallacy phenomenon [5].

In the same year 2012 Martinez et al [6] proposed Customized Policies for Handling Partial Information in Relational Databases. In this they propose the general concept of partial information policy (PIP) operator to handle incompleteness in relational databases. PIP machinists build upon partiality frameworks for unfinished information, but contain different types of unfinished data (e.g., a value exists but is not known; a value does not exist; a value may or may not exist). Dissimilar users in the real world have different ways in which they want to handle incompleteness - PIP operators allow them to specify a policy that matches their attitude to risk and their knowledge of the application. They also offered index structures for efficiently evaluating PIP operators. As per their result, it is shown that the adoption of such index structures allows to efficiently managing very large datasets. Additionally they also showed that PIP operators can be combined with relational algebra operators, giving even more capabilities to users to manage their incomplete data [6].

In this they worked with two data sets containing extensive incomplete information. One encloses data connected with terror groups. The other is one of the most authoritative data sets about education in the world from the World Bank and UNESCO. This Data was collected manually through extensive surveys, there are many incomplete entries. The incompleteness is due to many factors (like conflict in the country). In all the works dealing with the management of incomplete databases, the DBMS dictates how incomplete information should be handled. However, the stock analyst knows stocks, the market, and his own management's or client's attitude toward risk better than a DB developer who has never seen the stock DB [6].

As per result analysis they first compared the times taken by the naive and index based approaches to evaluate a PIP operator. They varied the size of the DB up to 15 million tuples and the "amount of incompleteness" by randomly selecting tuples and inserting nulls in them. The execution times for the index approach include both the time to compute the result of a PIP operator *and* the time taken to compute the associated indexes. The gap between the two approaches increases significantly as the DB size increases with the index-based approach significantly outperforming. Later on they measured the time to execute tuple insertions, deletions, and updates. The index-based approach is faster than the naive approach, when tuple deletions are performed, but slower for tuple insertions and updates, though the differences are negligible and do not significantly increase as the database size increases. This small overhead is due to the management of the different data structures the index-based approach relies on and is paid back by the better performances achieved for PIP operator evaluation. As per above result shows that evaluating PIP operators is significantly faster with our index structures, but tuple insertions and updates are slightly slower (though tuple deletions are faster) [6].

SHI and ZHU proposed a fine-grained access control model for relational databases [7]. In this they propose a new Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) model which supports the specification of open access control policies with closed access control policies in relational databases. For integrating FGAC into relational databases, it is necessary to provide a FGAC model which can support the specification of many access control policies. Proposed FGAC model has two key features: supporting the specification of open access control policies as well as closed access control policies, and supporting multiple policies. This model was implemented as a component of database management system [7].

In the projected FGAC model, they apply the policy filter with the Allowed Filter and the Prohibited Filter to identify which information can be admittance and which information is prohibited. Filters permit the FGAC model to support closed admittance control policies and open access control policies. This FGAC model takes the restricted object to substitute the object in the traditional access control model in relational databases. Because object is a special case of the restricted object, the FGAC model is extended from traditional access control models, and can be compatible with them [7].

FGAC controls the access of users in a relational database and the access modes include select, insert, update, and delete. In relational databases, there exist mainly two approaches to granting privileges to users. One is to directly assign permissions to users, and the other is to grant privileges to the roles that users are assigned. FGAC models should support both of these authorization approaches. When FGAC is enforced in relational databases, not only should the cost of the implementation of the select operation be evaluated, but also the performance of the DBMS. The FGAC policies did affect the performance; the system performance was rational, almost linear and thus acceptable. Performance results showed that the proposed model and the implementation approach are feasible [7].

Baohua et al [8] proposed A Formal Multilevel Database Security Model. A multilevel database security model increases integrity examination in the foundation of original secret request. The comparison way of the subject and the object is corresponded with the manner of operating method, and it strengthens the security and the usability of the system. The formal multilevel database security model is applied in LogicSQL security database management system. System.LogicSQL database is the independent development high security rank database based on the Linux. The multilevel database protection model is applied in the LogicSQL database management system [8].

Sohail and Hyder [9] proposed Security Issues in Databases. The security issues and requirements for discretionary and mandatory security models for the protection of conventional database systems and object oriented database systems are illustrated in [9]. Several proposals for discretionary and mandatory security models for the protection of conventional databases and object-oriented database systems are presented. Still, there is not a standard for designing these security models. This study gives a collected picture of different security issues of database; it can be extended to define, design and implement an effective security policy on a database environment and provides a consolidated view of database security.

As database technology look forward into new applications areas, the requirements changes and become more critical as well as demanding. Object model provides a superset of the functionalities of relational database management system. Many of the commercial relational database management systems are incorporating object-oriented concepts to facilitate database design and development in the increasingly object-oriented world. The incorporation of object-oriented concepts offers new tools for securing the data stored in the object databases. Security issues in relational databases are achieved comparatively with ease as compared to object databases since it is based on some formal mathematical model [9].

In [9] authors also discuss about various security problems in object oriented database system namely Polyinstantiation Aggregation and Inference problem.

a. Polyinstantiation: This problem arises when users with different security levels attempt to use the identical information. The assortment of clearances and sensitivities in a protected data base system result in conflicts between the objects that can be accessed and modified by the users. Through the use of polyinstantiation, information is positioned in multiple locations, generally with dissimilar security levels. Perceptibly, the more susceptible information is omitted from the instances with lower security levels. Although polyinstantiation solves the multiparty update divergence problem, it elevates a potentially greater problem in the variety of ensuring the integrity of the data within the database. Without some scheme of concurrently updating all incidents of the data in the database, the truthfulness of the information rapidly disappears. In quintessence, the system becomes a collection of numerous distinct data base systems, each with its own data [9].

i. **Object Value polyinstantiation:** an unclassified user views a specific object different from a Secret subject views.

ii. **Class Structure polyinstantiation:** an Unclassified subject views a specific class consisting of the instance variables different from a Secret subject views in terms of instance variables.

iii. **Class method polyinstantiation:** an unclassified user views EMP as having the methods get-name, change-name while the Secret subject views EMP as having methods get-name, change-name, get-salary, change-salary.

iv. **Method polyinstantiation:** an unclassified user views a method update-salary to have one parameter which is the amount by which the salary should be increased. A Secret user views this method as having two parameters; one is the amount and the other is the new salary value which is returned to the user.

b. Aggregation: The aggregation problem occurs when a user can from aggregates of related items, all of which are classified at some level, that deduce classified data. The higher level information (which may be thought to be subject to a higher level of security clearance) may be inferred from a large number of lower level data items [9].

c. Inference problem: The word "inference" means "forming a conclusion from premises". Many user of any database can illustrate inferences from the information they have obtained from the database and prior additional information (known as supplementary knowledge) they have. The inference can lead to information disclosure if the user is able to access to information they are not authorized to read. This is the inference problem in the database security [9].

In year 2012 T. Swetha et al [10] proposed Database Intrusion Detection Response System. The intrusion detection system is responsible for issuing a suitable response to request. They describe the database response policies to support intrusion response system. It is very easy for the database administrators to specify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the nature of the anomalous request.

The response component is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous user request. They [10] offered the concept of database response policies for specifying appropriate response actions. They [10] accessible an interactive Event-Condition-Action type response policy language that makes it very easy for the database security administrator to specify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the nature of the anomalous request. In this ID mechanism consists of two chief elements, exclusively tailored to a DBMS: an anomaly detection (AD) system and an anomaly response system. The very first component is based on the construction of database access profiles of functions and users, and on the use of such profiles for the Attack. A user-request that does not be conservative to the normal access profiles is characterized as anomalous. The second element of this approach is in charge of taking some actions once an anomaly is identified. There are main three types of response actions respectively, conservative actions, fine-grained actions, and aggressive actions. As per result obtained this algorithm was efficient [10].

D. Jayanthi and M. Suresh [11] proposed Intrusion Response System for Relational Databases Using Joint Threshold Administration Model. The intrusion response component of an overall intrusion detection system is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous request. The database response policies to support the intrusion response system tailored for a DBMS is proposed, which makes easy for the database Administrators to specify appropriate response actions based on the characteristics of anomalous request [11].

This work proposed an interactive Event-Condition-Action type response policy language that makes it very easy for the database security administrator to specify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the nature of the anomalous request is presented. The detection of an anomaly by the detection engine can be considered as the system event. An Event-Condition-Action (ECA) language is used for specifying response policies. An ECA rule is typically organized as follows:

ON {Event} IF {Condition} THEN {Action}

If the event arises and the condition evaluates to true, the specified action is executed. In this context, an event is the detection of an anomaly by the detection engine. A circumstance is individual on the attributes of the detected anomaly and on the attributes representing the internal state of the DBMS. An action is the internal response action executed by the engine [10].

The other issue that is the administration of response policies to prevent malicious modifications to policy objects from legitimate users. And also avoid from raising false alarm. JTAM, a novel administration model, based on Shoup's [12] threshold cryptographic signature scheme is proposed. An interactive response policy that requires a second factor of authentication will provide a second layer of defense when certain anomalous actions are executed against critical system resources such as anomalous access to system catalog tables. This opens the technique to new research on how to organize applications to handle such interactions for the case of legacy applications and new applications. In the safety measures area there is a lot work dealing with retrofitting legacy applications for authorization policy enforcement. Such approaches can be extended to support such an interactive method. For new applications, one can formulate methodologies to organize applications that support such interactions. However, because the approach is strategy based, the DBAs have the elasticity of designing policies that best fit the way applications are organized [11].

Fatima Nayeem et al [13] proposed Policies Based Intrusion Response System for DBMS. Intrusion response system for a relational database is essential to protect it from external and internal attacks. They offer a new intrusion response system for relational databases based on the database response policies. They developed an interactive language that helps database administrators to determine the responses to be provided by the response system based on the malicious requests encountered by relational database. They also maintain a policy database that maintains policies with esteem to response system. For penetrating the appropriate policies algorithms are designed and implemented. The proposed system also takes care of internal attacks from DBAs who have privileges to do important activities. Even for administrators also role based access restrictions are provided. According to result proposed response system is effective and can provide accurate responses based on the response policies maintained in the policy database.

The ID mechanism approach [13] has two important aspects. They are actually altered for database management systems. They are acknowledged as Anomaly response system and anomaly detection. The former is achieved using database access profiles or users and roles. This paper focuses on the second aspect that is taking actions once detection of anomaly is completed. The proposed approach follows a proactive approach in showing alerts and blocking the anomalous request. The response actions are fine – grained and they are not aggressive or conservative. When a request is suspected, it is kept on hold until further authentication steps are carried out to verify the validity of the request. It is also possible to mark a request tainted indicating that the request is potentially suspicious. As there is need for different responses based on the malicious requests, the key is to address the response measure problem [13].

When a response system is required which takes actions involuntarily when malicious requests are encountered, it is not a simple task. The key idea to solve this is to monitor the context in which such request is made. To address the problem a suitable response policy is required that can cater to the needs of all situations. Policy administration and policy matching are the two issues addressed in terms of response policies. Response policy can be built as regular database object which takes care of particular response. However, it represents various challengers instead of simply storing data as other database objects. The user which DBA role only can create policy objects in the database. In this administration model the basic problem is identified and named as conflict of interest. Insider threat is the main issue in this case which throws challenges and demands such accurate response system which is made up of response policies [13].

K.Shanmuga Priya proposed Database Response Policies to Support Intrusion Response System for DBMS [14]. A database to detect potential intrusions, intrusion detection (ID), is a crucial technique that has to be part of any comprehensive security solution for high assurance database security. The two main issues that address in the context of such response policies are that of policy matching and policy administration. Policy corresponding is the difficulty of searching for policies applicable to an uncharacteristic request. Whenever an anomaly is detected, the response scheme must investigate in the course of the policy database and find policies that match the anomaly. The second issue that address is that of administration of response policies. A response policy can be considered as a regular database object such as a table or a view [14].

Response Actions: The response action to be executed is specified as part of a response policy. The conservative actions are low rigorousness actions. Such actions may register the anomaly details or throw an alert, but they do not proactively avoid an intrusion. On the other hand Aggressive actions are high severity responses. Such actions are skilled of preventing an intrusion proactively by dropping the request, separating the user or revoking/denying the indispensable privileges. Fine-grained response actions are neither too conventional nor too aggressive. Such actions may suspend or contaminate an anomalous request. A suspended request is basically put on hold, until a few specific actions are accomplished by the user. A tainted request is merely marked as a potential suspicious request resulting in further monitoring the user in suspension or dropping of subsequent requests by the same user [14].

Interactive ECA Response Policies: An ECA policy is sufficient to trigger simple response measures such as disconnecting users, falling an anomalous demand, conveyance an alert, and so forth. In several cases, conversely, it is to engage in interactions with users. For example, suppose the detection of an anomaly, want to execute a fine grained response action by suspending the anomalous request. Then the user to authenticate, using a second authentication factor as the subsequently action. In case the verification fails, the client is disconnected. If not, the request continues. As ECA strategies are not capable to support such progression of actions and then enlarge with a confirmation action construct. A confirmation action is the succeeding course of action after the early response action. Its intention is to interact with the user to determine the effects of the preliminary action. If the authentication action is successful, the resolution action is implemented; else the failure action is executed [14].

Policy Administration: The main issue in the administration of response policies is how to protect a policy from malicious modifications made by a DBA that has legitimate access rights to the policy object. To address this issue, an administration model referred to as the JTAM is proposed. The JTAM protects a response policy against malicious modifications by maintaining a digital signature on the policy characterization. The signature is then authenticating either periodically or upon policy usage to verify the integrity of the policy definition. If the DBMS had possessed such key, it could simply create a HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) of each policy using its confidential key, and later use the equivalent key to corroborate the integrity of the policy [14].

JTAM Setup: Before the response policies can be used, a number of security constraints are registered with the DBMS as part of an on one occasion registration phase. The features of the registration phase are as follows: The parameter l is set equal to the number of DBAs registered with the DBMS. Such requirement allows any DBA to generate a valid signature share on a policy entity, in this manner making this approach very stretchy. This is because it relies on a special property of the RSA modulus, explicitly, that it should be the product of two secure primes. The DBMS is to be the trusted component that generates the security parameters [14].

Base Policy Matching: The policy matching algorithm is invoked when the response engine receives an anomaly detection assessment. For every attribute A in the anomaly assessment, the algorithm estimates the predicates defined on A. After calculating a predicate, the algorithm trace all the policy nodes associated to the estimated predicate node. If the predicate calculates to true, the scheme increments the predicate-match count of the attached policy nodes by one. A policy is coordinated when its predicate-match-count becomes equivalent to the number of predicates in the policy condition. On the other hand, if the predicate estimates to false, the scheme identifies the linked policy nodes as invalidated [14].

Ordered Policy Matching: The searching procedure is in the base policy matching algorithm. This algorithm does not go through the predicates according to a fixed order. A heuristic by which the predicates are evaluated in descending order of their policy-count; the policy-count of a predicate being the number of policies that the predicate belongs to. The ordered policy matching algorithm is that choosing the correct order of predicates is important as it may lead to an early termination of the policy search procedure either by invalidating all the policies or by exhausting all the predicates [14].

The response component is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous user demand. An interactive Event-Condition-Action type reaction policy language is constructing it very easy for the database. The two main issues that addressed in the context of such response policies are policy corresponding, and policy administration. For the policy matching procedure, the algorithms are efficiently to search the policy database for policies matching an anomalous request. The other issue is the administration of response policies to prevent malicious modifications to policy objects from legitimate users [14].

R.Jothi and N. Rathika proposed Multi-Hand Administration with an Intrusion Response System in Databases [15]. They recommend the notion of database response policies to sustain intrusion response system tailored for a DBMS. Interactive response policy language makes it very straightforward for the database administrators to identify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the temperament of the anomalous request.

This approach to an ID method consists of two major fundamentals, exclusively tailored to a DBMS: an anomaly detection (AD) system and an anomaly response system. The primary component is based on the construction of database entrance profiles of roles and users, and using such profiles for the AD task. A user request that does not be conventional to the normal access profiles is characterized as anomalous [15].

There are three most important types of response actions that are correspondingly, as conventional actions, fine-grained actions, and aggressive actions. The conventional actions, such as sending an alert, permit the anomalous request to go through, while the aggressive actions can successfully block the anomalous demand. Fine-grained response actions, on the other hand, are neither conventional nor aggressive [15].

Anomaly Attributes: The detection mechanism for anomaly gives the anomaly estimation with the help of anomaly attributes. Two foremost categories for those attributes have been acknowledged such as contextual category and structural category. Contextual category includes the whole attributes elaborating the perspective of the anomalous requests like user, role, source and time. Structural category includes the total attributes which are conveying information about the anomalous request structure like admittance database objects and SQL command. By using the attributes of the anomaly the detection engine surrenders the characterization of the anomaly [15].

Policy Administration: The main problem in the administration progression of policy responding is how to safeguard the policy from malicious modifications which are done by the DBA who has the authentic access rights for the object of the policy. To address this issue, they [15] had noted the following things.

Implementation of conformation actions similar to second factor of authentication or the re authentication needs certain modifications in the communication protocol among the server and the database clients. These cases are used in the circumstances such as confirmation actions that are useful while the malicious subjects are able to bypass the initial authentication mechanism for the database management system because of the vulnerability in the software like overflow of buffer or because of attacks in the social engineering like using the some others unlocked unattended terminal [15].

While considering the interactive response that the user is not requisite the resolution or malfunction or conformation actions that may be misplaced from the policy [15].

The vulnerability case they presuppose is that the DBA has the complete rights in the DBMS and so it is capable of executing the subjective SQL update, insert and delete commands in order to do certain malevolent modifications to the policies. These are possible even when the policies are stored in the system catalog itself. JTAM protects the response policy in opposition to the modifications during the progression of digital signature on the policy description. Then the signature is confirmed and validated occasionally or upon the usage of the policy in order to ensure the policy definition integrity. The basic theory of the approach is that they don’t trust a solitary DBA for creating or managing the response policies but hazard the mitigated if the expectation is disturbed among various DBAs. Thus creating a response policy is not an individual predicament it should be legitimate with k DBAs [15].

JTAM: Sooner than the response policies can be used, a number of security parameters are registered with the DBMS as ingredient of a onetime registration phase. The details of the registration phase are as follows: The parameter l is set equivalent to the number of DBAs registered with the DBMS. Such prerequisite allows any DBA to produce a convincing signature share on a policy object, thereby making this approach very flexible. Shoup's scheme [12] also necessitates a trusted dealer to engender the security parameters. This is because it relies on an extraordinary property of the RSA modulus, namely, that it must be the product of two safe primes [15].

Signature Share Verification: It is possible for a malicious administrator to replace a valid signature share with some other signature share that is generated on a different policy definition. Nevertheless, such attack will be unsuccessful as the final signature that is formed by the signature share combining algorithm will not be legitimate. Note that by submitting an unacceptable signature share, a malicious administrator can obstruct the creation of an applicable policy. They do not see this as a most important problem since the threat scenario that is address is malicious modifications to obtainable policies, and not generation of policies themselves [15].

Final Signature Verification: A final signature on a policy is present in all the policy states except the CREATED state. As explained earlier, the concluding signature is confirmed using the public key (n, e) corresponding to the value of k. The public key is assumed to be signed using a trusted third party certificate that cannot be forged. Thus, if a malicious DBA replaces the server produced public key, the finishing signature will be overthrow. Separately from verifying the final signature instantaneously after policy commencement, suspension, and fall, the signature must also be verified before a policy may be considered in the policy matching process. Such approach ensures that only the set of response policies, that have not been interfered, are considered for responding to an anomaly [15].

Malicious Policy Update: A policy may be modified by a malicious DBA using the SQL update statement. Conversely, all policy explanation attributes that require to be protected are hashed and signed; consequently any modification to such attributes in the course of the SQL update command will overthrow the final signature on the policy [15].

Malicious Policy Deletion: An authorized policy may be deleted by a malicious DBA using the SQL delete command. However in JTAM, a policy tuple is not at all physically deleted; only its state is distorted to DELETED. Thus, a signature on the policy-count can be used to identify malicious removal of policy tuples. The comprehensive approach is as follows: When the Create Response Policy authority is executed; the DBMS counts the number of policy tuples present in the database. It augmentation such policy-count by one to explanation for the new policy being created [15].

A hash is taken on the new policy-count and state = VALID, and a signature share is generated on such hash. The signature share, strategy or policy id of the policy being created, the k value of the policy being created, and the initial state = INVALID are all stored in the sys_response_policy_count catalog. Note that the policy id that is inserted in the sys_response_policy_count table represents the latest policy that has been created. During policy commencement, the DBMS first checks if the policy id present in sys_response_policy_count matches the id of the policy currently being activated. If the confirm succeeds, it counts the number of policy tuples in the database, and generates a signature allocate on the hash of the policy-count, and state = VALID. If the check fails, no signature share is generated [15].

Signature Replay Attacks: A malicious DBA can create a copy of the ultimate signature on a policy. It can then repeat the copied signature, that is, it can substitute the existing signature on the policy with the derivative signature and change the policy state to the state corresponding to the unoriginal signature. This attack is probable since they permit alterations to an existing policy object. To address this attack, they duplicate the policy state to a system column of the sys_response_policy catalog. A system discourse of a table is a column that is managed exclusively by the DBMS and its contents cannot be modified by any user. In case the policy condition in the system column does not equivalent the policy state in the column observable to the user, a policy integrity violation is detected [15].

Policy Replay Attacks: A malicious DBA may insert a previously authorized policy tuple, whose circumstances have been misrepresented to DROPPED, into the sys_response_policy catalog. Such attack can be prohibited as follows: There is a unique policy id connected with each policy tuple that is generated by the DBMS. If a malicious DBA tries to insert a beforehand authorized policy tuple, the DBMS will generate a fresh policy id for the new tuple. Since the hash of the policy, H (Pol), takes into account the policy id, the final signature on such maliciously inserted policy tuple will be invalidated [15].

The response component of intrusion detection system for a DBMS is described. The response component is responsible for issuing a suitable response to an anomalous user request. An interactive Event-Condition-Action type response policy language is presented that makes it very easy for the database security administrator to specify appropriate response actions for different circumstances depending upon the nature of the anomalous request [15].

4. CONCLUSION

The intrusion response element of taken as a whole intrusion detection system is conscientious for issuing an appropriate response to an anomalous request. In today's scenario database related transactions are growing rapidly. Data correspond to today a significant asset for companies and organizations. Some of these data are significance millions of dollars and organizations take enormous care at controlling entrance to these data, with respect to both internal users, within the organization, and external users, outside the organization. Monitoring a database to distinguish prospective intrusions, intrusion detection (ID), is an essential technique that has to be part of any widespread security solution for high-assurance database security. Here we present recent trends of security in respect to database. There are various techniques used for better performance of database system to detect anomaly and other security related issues.

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